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WYETH v. LEVINE:
EXAMINING THE DOCTRINE OF
IMPLIED PREEMPTION IN STATELAW TORT CLAIMS
ALLISON KOSTECKA*

I. INTRODUCTION
Wyeth v. Levine has been heralded “The Mother of all Preemption
Cases”1 and “the business case of the century.”2 The significance of the
decision transcends the individuals involved and could have
substantial repercussions for both consumers and drug
manufacturers.3
The tragic facts giving rise to this case began in April 2000, when
respondent Diana Levine lost an arm to gangrene after the improper
administration of Phenergan, an anti-nausea drug manufactured by
4
Wyeth. Levine sued Wyeth in a Vermont state court alleging
negligence for failure to provide a warning label that strongly
cautioned against, or even proscribed, certain methods of
administering Phenergan.5
Wyeth’s defense to the suit was based on an implied preemption
theory. Wyeth argued that the Food and Drug Administration’s
(“FDA”) explicit approval of Phenergan’s warning label preempted

* 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Jacob Goldstein, Wyeth v. Levine: The Mother of All Preemption Cases, WALL ST. J.,
Sept.
19,
2008,
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2008/09/19/wyeth-v-levine-the-mother-of-allpreemption-cases/.
2. Alicia Mundy and Shirley S. Wang, In Drug Case, Justices to Weigh Right to Sue, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 24, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122506300017470355.html.
3. See id. (reporting that the decision could sharply limit an individual’s right to sue drug
manufacturing companies for death or injury caused by medicine, resulting in billon-dollar
savings for the pharmaceutical industry in litigation and settlement costs).
4. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006).
5. Id.
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Levine’s common law cause of action.6 The jury found in favor of
Levine and awarded her $2.4 million in economic and $5 million in
non-economic damages.7
In October 2006, the Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed the
lower court’s decision, holding that Levine’s claims were not
preempted by the FDA’s approval of the Phenergan label.8 The
United States Supreme Court granted Wyeth’s petition for certiorari
to decide whether FDA approval of prescription drug labels preempts
state law product liability claims.9
II. FACTS
A. Circumstances Giving Rise to Levine’s Injury
Diana Levine, a professional musician, habitually suffered from
intense migraines accompanied by severe nausea.10 On several
occasions, Levine went to Northeast Washington County Community
11
Health Center (Health Center) to treat her ailment. Her typical
treatment consisted of a dosage of Demerol for the migraine pain and
12
a dosage of Phenergan for the nausea.
The preferred method of administering Phenergan is through an
intramuscular injection, but the drug can also be administered
13
through an intravenous (“IV”) injection. The proffered benefit of
intravenously administering Phenergan is more immediate nausea
relief,14 but there are also significant risks associated with IV
administration, including a chance that arterial blood will be exposed
15
to the drug. Phenergan can cause severe tissue deterioration and
lead to gangrene when exposed to arterial blood.16 Because there is no

6. Id. at 182–83.
7. Id. The original jury award was reduced to $6.7 million.
8. Id. at 183.
9. Brief for the Respondent at i, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Aug. 7, 2008).
10. Adam Liptak, Drug Label, Maimed Patient and Crucial Test for Justices, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/us/19scotus.html.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at 9.
14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Mar. 12, 2007).
15. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at 10.
16. Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 183 n.1.
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treatment that can reverse the onset of gangrene after exposure
occurs, amputation of the affected appendage is invariably required.17
There are two procedures available for the intravenous
administration of Phenergan: the “IV drip” procedure and the “IV
18
push” procedure. The IV-drip procedure allows gravity to pull the
medication mixed with saline solution slowly into the patient’s veins
through tubing attached to a hanging IV bag; the IV-push procedure
directly forces the medicine into a patent’s vein using a syringe.19 The
IV-push procedure significantly increases the risk of arterial blood
being exposed to Phenergan due to the likelihood of inadvertently
puncturing an artery or piercing through a vein.20
In April 2000, Levine suffered from a migraine and nausea and
went to the Health Center for her usual treatment.21 Levine’s initial
dose of Phenergan was administered through an intramuscular
injection.22 Unfortunately, her nausea did not subside and later that
day she returned to the Health Center where a second dose of
23
Phenergan was administered by an IV-push procedure. According to
trial testimony, the physician treating Levine did not understand the
24
severe risks associated with the IV-push procedure. The physician
testified that he would have used the safer IV-drip method of
intravenous administration had the warning been apparent on the
drug’s label.25
The Phenergan administered through the IV-push procedure
26
made contact with Levine’s arterial blood and she suffered from a
swift onset of gangrene that ultimately resulted in the amputation of
27
her hand and forearm. This tragically ended Levine’s career as a
musician.

17. Id.
18. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at 9.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id. The proper functioning of the drip bag requires appropriate placement into a vein,
allowing for mistakes to be corrected before the flow of the drug begins. Thus, the risk of
inadvertent arterial exposure with the IV-drip procedure is much less than the risk associated
with the IV-push procedure. Id.
21. Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 182.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2008).
25. Id.
26. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006).
27. Id.
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B. Evolution of the FDA’s approval of Phenergan
In 1955, the FDA initially evaluated and approved Phenergan
along with directions that stated the drug could be safely
28
administered through either intramuscular or intravenous injection.
Twelve years later, Wyeth discovered that exposure of Phenergan to
arterial blood could cause gangrene and that IV administration of
Phenergan increased the likelihood that such exposure would occur.29
Wyeth reported this discovery to the FDA and in the following years
Wyeth, often at the FDA’s request, continually refined the Phenergan
label with respect to the warning for IV administration.30 Despite
incessant modification to the Phenergan label, there is no evidence
that Wyeth or the FDA considered the relative safety of the two
methods of IV administration (IV-push as opposed to IV-drip) or
thought to emphasize the heightened risk of, or even proscribe the use
of, the IV-push procedure.31
In 1979, the FDA enacted new regulations specifying the format
32
required for all prescription drug labels. To comply with the new
rules, Wyeth submitted a Supplemental New Drug Application with a
33
revised label. The new label was approved in 1998, after years of
34
revision. The Phenergan warning used in April 2000 was two pages
long and stated in relevant part:
28. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. May 2008).
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id.
31. Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 188–89 (“Defendant has provided a number of letters exchanged by
the FDA and defendant regarding Phenergan’s label, but these letters do not indicate the
FDA’s opinion of the value of IV-push administration. Neither the letters nor any other
evidence presented to the jury indicated that the FDA wished to preserve the use of IV-push as
a method of administering Phenergan.”).
32. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 28, at 14.
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id. In 1987, the FDA recommended revisions pertaining to, among other things, the
warning against inadvertent intra-arterial injection on the Phenergan label. In 1988, Wyeth
incorporated the suggested changes as well as its own alterations and resubmitted the label to
the FDA for final approval. The draft stated in relevant part:
INADVERTANT INTRA-ARTERIAL INJECTION: There are reports of necrosis
leading to gangrene, requiring amputation, following injection of [Phenergan], usually
in conjunction with other drugs; the intravenous route was intended in these cases, but
arterial or partial arterial placement of the needle is now suspect . . . .
There is no established treatment other than prevention:
1)Beware of the close proximity of arteries and veins at commonly used injection
sites and consider the possibility of aberrant arteries.
2)When used intravenously, [Phenergan] should be given in a concentration no
greater than 25 mg/ ml and a rate not to exceed 25mg/minute. Injection through a
properly running intravenous infusion may enhance the possibility of detecting
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INADVERTANT INTRA-ARTERIAL INJECTION: Due to the
close proximity of arteries and veins in the areas most commonly
used for intravenous injection, extreme care should be exercised to
avoid perivascular extravasations or inadvertent intra-arterial
injection. Reports compatible with inadvertent intra-arterial
injection of (Phenergan), usually in conjunction with other drugs
intended for intravenous use, suggest that pain, severe chemical
irritation, severe spasm of distal vessels, and resultant gangrene
requiring amputation are likely under such circumstances.
Intravenous injection was intended in all the cases reported but
perivascular extravasations or arterial placement of the needle is
now suspect. There is no proven successful management of this
condition after it occurs . . . .
When administering any irritant drug intravenously it is usually
preferable to inject it through the tubing of an intravenous
35
infusion set that is known to be functioning satisfactorily.

Following her amputation, Levine sued Wyeth for failure to warn
consumers of the potential dangers associated with the IV-push
administration of Phenergan. Wyeth moved for summary judgment
prior to trial and for judgment as a matter of law following the trial,
both times asserting two arguments based on implied preemption: (1)
that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply with both the FDA’s
labeling requirements and the demands of Vermont’s common law;
and (2) that liability in state courts for the use of FDA-approved
labels presents an obstacle to the federal objectives of the Federal
Drug and Cosmetics Act.36 Both motions were denied and the jury
found in favor of Levine.37

arterial placement. In addition, this results in delivery of a lower concentration of
any arteriolar irritant. See Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 183 n.1 (Vt. 2006).
This draft was rejected by the FDA and the FDA told Wyeth to “retain the verbiage in the
current label,” pertaining to inadvertent intra-arterial injections. Brief for Petitioner, supra note
28, at 16. The FDA rejection was perhaps due to the view that the changes made were “nonsubstantive and rejected . . . for formatting reasons.” Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 13.
Wyeth once again reworked the Phenergan label and submitted it to the FDA on May 8, 1998,
when it was finally approved. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 28, at 16. The FDA approval letter
specified that the final printed label insert should be identical to the approved draft. Id.
35. See Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 183 n.1 (quoting the Phenergan label).
36. Id. at 183.
37. Id. at 182.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Vermont Supreme Court’s decision to uphold Levine’s award
was primarily predicated on the requirements of the preemption
doctrine, the federal regulatory authority of the FDA, and the
intersection of the FDA’s authority and state common law.
A. The Doctrine of Preemption
According to the United States Constitution, federal law is the
“supreme Law of the Land.”38 This basic concept lays the foundational
groundwork for the Supremacy Clause, which, according to the
Supreme Court, embodies the notion that “state law that conflicts
with federal law is ‘without effect.’”39 The preemption doctrine can be
a defense to state law claims that conflict with federal law or federal
objectives.40 Out of respect for state sovereignty, there is a
presumption against preemption.41 This presumption is strengthened
42
when the area of law at issue has a long history of state regulation.
There are two general circumstances in which federal law
preempts state law. First, Congress can explicitly preempt state law via
43
statutory language or language in the legislative history. Second,
Congress can express its intent to control an entire field of regulation
leaving states no option to supplement the federal regulation with
additional requirements.44
Congressional intent to preempt state law can be discovered
through an examination of the statute itself, the legislative history, and
45
the pervasiveness of the federal regulations. If a thorough

38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
39. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
40. E.g., Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1001 (2008) (holding FDA’s premarket
approval process established federal regulations that preempted plaintiff’s state law claims for
negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty).
41. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[B]ecause the states are
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not
cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of action.”).
42. E.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (explaining that a long
history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisons added force to the presumption
against preemption by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).
43. Beverly L. Jacklin, Annotation, Federal pre-emption of state common-law products
liability clams pertaining to drugs, medical devices, and other health-related items, 98 A.L.R. FED.
124 (1990).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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examination of the aforementioned items does not shed insight on
congressional intent, the judiciary can consider the nature of the
statutory scheme and the logistics of allowing both federal and state
46
regulation. If there is a national interest in uniformity, and dual
regulation would detract from that uniformity, then congressional
intent to preempt can be inferred.47 Congressional intent to preempt
can also be inferred when the state law stands as an obstacle to the
48
accomplishment of congressional objectives.
Only clear congressional intent to supersede state law can
49
overcome the presumption against preemption. But, congressional
50
intent can be express or implied. Without evidence of express
preemption, implied preemption can prevail only if there is an actual
51
conflict between federal and state law. An actual conflict exists when
“it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and
federal requirements, or when state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”52
B. Regulatory Authority of the FDA
For much of the 19th century, states regulated domestically
produced foods and drugs.53 After several prominent disasters
resulted from the inadequacy of these regulations, public support
54
increased for federal regulation of the food and drug industry. In
response to the growing public demand, Congress passed the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) in 1938. 55 The FDCA provided for
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) as the regulatory agency
in charge of evaluating and approving all drugs sold in the United

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
50. E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)(“In the absence of an
express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with
federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
51. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
52. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002).
53. John P. Swann, FDA, in THE HISTORICAL GUIDE TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
(George Kurian, ed, 1998).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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States.56 The FDA is the only federal agency monitoring the safety,
efficacy, and accessibility of drugs in the United States’ market.57 To
do this, the FDA requires drug manufacturers to show that their drugs
are “safe and effective” for approved uses and that the labeling is not
“false or misleading.”58
The FDA’s approval process begins when the drug manufacturer
59
submits a New Drug Application (NDA) for approval. The FDA
completes its evaluation according to the following criteria set forth in
the FDCA: (1) whether test results establish that the drug is “safe for
use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in
the proposed labeling;” (2) whether there is “substantial evidence that
the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have
under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in
the proposed labeling;” and (3) whether, “based on a fair evaluation
of all material facts, such labeling is false or misleading.”60 If the
61
statutory elements are satisfied, the FDA must approve the NDA;
though prior to the drug’s distribution, the FDA requires a final label
submission and can compel changes if necessary.62
The drug manufacturer is responsible for conducting the research
and testing prior to the NDA’s submission.63 When testing a new drug,
clinical trials are relatively small and focused on isolating variables
64
concerning the disposition of the tested individuals. Although these
limitations are beneficial for testing the specific effects of the drug,
they often fail to accurately demonstrate how the drug will work
when prescribed to the diverse population at large.65
56. Id.
57. See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 393(b) (West 2008); see also United States v. Sullivan 332
U.S. 689, 696 (1948) (stating the primary goal in enacting the FDCA was “to protect consumers
from dangerous products”).
58. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(b), 76 Stat. 780, 781 (1962)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b) (West 2006)).
59. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(a)(West 2006).
60. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d).
61. Id.
62. 21 U.S.C.A. §355(b)(1)(F).
63. David A. Kessler and David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to
Preempt Failure-to-Warm Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 471 (2008).
64. Id.
65. See Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 471–72 (“[M]ost clinical studies ‘can detect
drug-related injuries that occur at a rate of between one in 500 and one in 1,000. Yet if the drug
is used by 200,000 people . . . a serious adverse event appearing in as few as one in 10,000 people
is very significant, since it would occur 20 times. These rare reactions can be identified only after
a drug has been widely used.’”) (quoting from William B. Schultz, How to Improve Drug Safety,
WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2004, at A35)
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When manufacturers discover unanticipated or adverse affects
associated with approved drugs, they are required to notify the FDA
and update consumer warnings.66 Because the FDA approval process
can be time consuming, a drug manufacturer can bypass the FDA
approval process and make label modifications on their own when
faced with compelling public safety concerns.67 In fact, drug
manufacturers are statutorily required to alter a drug’s label prior to
FDA approval when necessary for the safe administration of the
drug.68 Statutory language allows drug manufacturers to bypass the
approval process in order:
(A) To add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution,
or adverse reaction;
(B) To add or strengthen a statement about drug abuse,
dependence, psychological effect or over dosage;
(C) To add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and
administration that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug
69
product . . . .

If making a change prior to FDA approval, the drug manufacturer
must immediately inform the FDA and send a Supplemental New
70
Drug Application for a full review after-the-fact.
C. Intersection of FDA Regulations and State Common Law
When the FDCA was enacted in 1938, states had long-standing
71
legal remedies for patients injured by defective or mislabeled drugs.
Relying on this tradition of state regulation, Congress did not provide
an express preemption clause in the FDCA.72 In the 1962 amendments
to the FDCA, Congress explicitly stated its position on FDA approval
and preemption: “Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to the
66. 21 C.F.R.§ 314.70(a) (2006).
67. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6).
68. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (“labeling must be revised to include a warning about a
clinically significant hazard as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal association with a
drug”).
69. 21 C.F.R. §314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A)–(C).
70. 21 C.F.R. §314.70(c)(6).
71. Brief for Respondent, supra note 9, at 21.
72. See Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 462 (“No appellate court, before or after the
advent of the FDA, has held that a state-law failure-to-warn claim for a prescription drug is
preempted by federal law. And Congress has not acted to preempt or limit state damage
actions, even though it has long been aware of tort litigation over drug products . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
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Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be construed as
invalidating any provision of State law . . . unless there is a direct and
positive conflict between such amendments and such provision of
73
State law.” The FDA resisted becoming involved in state tort
litigation to preserve the incentive for drug manufacturers to discover
and publicize unknown side-effects and risks.74 This incentive enabled
75
the agency to better protect public health.
Taking into account the role of state failure-to-warn claims in
promoting public safety and the statutory allowance for drug
manufacturers to make changes without FDA approval, several
76
courts, most notably in cases involving the drug Zoloft, have held
that state failure-to-warn claims are not in conflict with federal law.77
Most of the opinions announcing this rule, however, are unpublished
state or federal district court opinions so their precedential effect is
minimal. In addition, at least a few courts have held that FDA
approval does preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims.78
79
Recently, the FDA’s policy on preemption has changed. In 2002,
the FDA began filing amicus briefs in favor of drug manufacturers,
asking courts to find that federal law preempted state law failure-towarn claims.80 The FDA’s new policy on preemption was formalized in

73. Drug Amendments of 1962 (Harris-Kefauver Act), Pub.L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat.
780, 793.
74. Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 463.
75. See In re Kessler, 100 F.3d 1015, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (state law actions make new
evidence available to the FDA, which can be evaluated when deciding whether labeling changes
are necessary); 21 C.F.R. § 20.1 (2006); Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 462–63.
76. Zoloft, or Sertaline HCI, is used to treat depression and certain anxiety disorders.
Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-3074-N, 2004 WL 1773697 at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
6, 2004.
77. See, e.g., Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., No. IP 98-1429-C-Y/S, 2002 WL 181972 at *1–*3
(S.D. Ind. Jan. 28, 2002) (denying preemption for state failure-to-warn claim); Caraker v.
Sandoz Pharm. Corp, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1032–44 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (denying preemption for
state failure-to-warn claim); Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 725 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003); Bell v. Lollar, 791 N.E.2d 849, 853–55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
78. See Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:03-CV-3074-N, 2004 WL 1773697 at *1
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004) (granting summary judgment to defendant based on conflict
preemption because warning advocated by plaintiff would be misleading); Ehilis v. Shire
Richwood, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1198 (D.N.D. 2002) (granting summary judgment on the
basis of conflict preemption after interpreting §314.70(c) to allow unapproved changes only
temporarily and only in “limited circumstances”).
79. Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 463.
80. See In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litg., No. M: 05-1699
CRB, 2006 WL 2374742, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) (observing the reversal in the FDA’s
view on preemption); Amicus Brief for the United State in Support of the Defendant-Appellee
and Cross-Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal of the District Court’s Order Denying Partial
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the preamble of a 2006 FDA rule regarding drug labeling.81 The
agency now asserts that state law decisions in failure-to-warn cases
impact the ability of the FDA to regulate drugs and to protect public
82
health. The FDA believes that state court decisions could force drug
manufacturers to either add warnings that have not been approved by
the FDA or to add warnings that have been specifically rejected by
83
the FDA in order to avoid state liability.
IV. HOLDING
In a 4-1 decision, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld Levine’s
failure-to-warn claim and the jury verdict in her favor.84 Relying
heavily on 21 C.F.R. §314.70(c) and interpreting it to “allow unilateral
changes to drug labels whenever the manufacturer believes it will
make the product safer,” the majority found that there was not a
direct conflict between the trial court’s judgment and federal
regulations.85 Because drug manufacturers are authorized to make
unilateral changes, Wyeth could have strengthened the warning on the
Phenergan label, particularly regarding the risk associated with IVpush administration, but still complied with FDA regulations.86 “While
specific federal labeling requirements and state common law duties
might otherwise leave drug manufacturers with conflicting
obligations, § 314.70(c) allows manufacturers to avoid state claims
without violating federal law.”87
The majority insisted that 21 C.F.R. §314.70(c) not only allows, but
indeed encourages drug manufacturers to add or strengthen warnings,
and that the detrimental effects of state failure-to-warn claims
provide incentive to take this action as soon as possible.88 In this sense,

Summary Judgment to Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at *15, Motus v. Pfizer, 388
F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498), 2002 WL 32303084.
81. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933-36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 201, 314, 601) (explaining the FDA’s new policy on preemption in preamble to
amendments).
82. Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 463.
83. Id.
84. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006).
85. Id. at 187.
86. See id. 188–89 (finding no evidence that the FDA’s approval of the Phenergan label
prevented Wyeth from changing the label to increase safety instructions).
87. Id. at 186.
88. Id.
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the majority saw FDA labeling requirements as setting “a floor, but
not a ceiling, for state regulation.”89
The majority found no evidence that the FDA’s rejection of the
proposed label in 1988 was an explicit indication that the FDA
carefully considered and subsequently decided the benefits to the IV90
push administration outweighed the risks. Thus, the FDA’s rejection
did not constrain Wyeth from modifying its label regarding the IV91
push administration method. In rejecting preemption for state
failure-to-warn claims, the Vermont Supreme Court not only
demonstrated respect for the historical presumption against
preemption, but also agreed with most other precedent on the issue.92
The majority also rejected Wyeth’s implied preemption argument
because it did not find that the state claim interfered with the purpose
of the FDCA.93 The congressional purpose underlying the FDCA’s
enactment and the FDA’s creation was to promote and protect public
94
safety. The majority determined that state law failure-to-warn claims
share that purpose.95 The court stated that “under any circumstances
where it is possible to comply with both state law and the FDCA, the
state law in question is consistent with the purposes and objections of
Congress.”96 Therefore, because Wyeth could comply with both state
and federal law, Wyeth could not argue that compliance interfered
97
with Congressional purpose.
The Court acknowledged policy arguments both in favor of and
against finding that state failure-to-warn claims conflict with
98
congressional purpose. Allowing state failure-to-warn claims could
make beneficial drugs less available to consumers.99 Curtailing these
failure-to-warn claims, however, could leave consumers injured by
100
harmful drugs without a legal remedy. The majority found both

89. Id. at 188.
90. Id. at 189.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 188.
93. Id. at 190.
94. Id.
95. See id. (looking to legislative history as evidence of Congress’s determination that
“[m]any very helpful State laws are in effect; many such laws in some instances are even
stronger than Federal laws for the protection of human health”).
96. Id. at 191.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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policy arguments moot because the plain language of the 1962
Amendments indicates that Congress did not intend to interfere with
state prerogatives unless there was a direct and insurmountable
101
conflict.
The Vermont Supreme Court refused to defer to the recent FDA
pro-preemption position reflected in the “Supplementary
Information” section of amendments to the FDA’s labeling
requirements. According to the majority, deference is inappropriate
because these amendments took effect in 2006, two years after this
102
incident occurred. In addition, deference to agency interpretation of
a statute or amendment is required only if the statute or amendment
is ambiguous.103 The Court held that the statute was decidedly
unambiguous, so deference to the agency interpretation was not
required.104
V. ANALYSIS
The strength of the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision lies in its
consistency with Congress’s historical acceptance of state failure-towarn claims.105 State law failure-to-warn claims have provided an
incentive for drug manufacturers to take responsibility for ensuring
106
their product is safe. Single-handedly regulating the drug market
would be extremely difficult for the FDA alone; it is charged with an
enormous task and has been severely under funded.107 Although the
FDA has an entire division devoted to monitoring drugs postapproval, according to a report by the Government Accountability
Office, this division not only “lacks clear and effective processes for
making decisions,” but also lacks clarity about its organizational role,
struggles with management oversight, and is limited by data

101. Id. at 190.
102. Id. at 192–93.
103. Id. at 192.
104. Id. at 192–93.
105. See Drug Amendments of 1962 (Harris-Kefauver Act), Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76
Stat. 780, 793 (nothing in the statutes that govern the FDA indicate an express or implied intent
to preempt state law actions); Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 462 (“No appellate court,
before or after the advent of the FDA, has held that a state-law failure-to-warn claim for a
prescription drug is preempted by federal law.”).
106. See id. at 463 (noting that drug companies have far greater resources than the FDA so
drug companies need the incentive provided by state law tort actions in order to effectively use
their resources to monitor drugs on the market and address safety concerns accordingly).
107. See Kessler and Vladeck, supra note 63, at 484 (describing how the FDA is
“hamstrung” by resource and authority limitations).
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constraints.108 With only one hundred employees, this division must
monitor over eleven thousand drugs on the market.109 In contrast, the
FDA’s Office of New Drugs employs over one thousand employees to
110
review only a few dozen new drug applications each year. When
comparing the small work force monitoring the continued use of
approved drugs with the frequent discovery of new adverse
111
reactions, the need for state law to supplement the regulatory
operations of the FDA becomes apparent.
An adverse judgment in a state failure-to-warn case does not
112
negate the FDA’s approval of a drug; nor do state failure-to-warn
claims force drug companies to revise labels: they simply force the
companies to pay damages for injuries caused by a faulty label.113 The
fact that a company can perform a cost-benefit analysis and decide to
keep its current label114 bolsters the argument that compliance with
both state and federal law is possible.115 Of course, the underlying
purpose of state law failure-to-warn actions is to provide incentive for
drug manufacturers to improve labels to increase safety, but this is not
a specifically required outcome of such an action.116
In order to make a valid claim for preemption, Wyeth must
demonstrate a clear congressional intent to preempt state law.117 Here,
there is no evidence of that intent in the FDCA or in its
118
amendments. This is in stark contrast to similar legislation, for
example the regulation of medical devices, where congress has

108. Improvement Needed in FDA’s Post-Market Decision-Making and Oversight Process,
HIGHLIGHTS OF GAO-06-402 (U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Drug Safety), Mar. 2006,
available at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-402.
109. Id. at 485 (quoting statement from Dr. Bruce S. Psaty).
110. Id. (quoting statement from Dr. Bruce S. Psaty).
111. Id. at 466.
112. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.80(e), 314.80 (2008) (no mention of adverse state law judgments
affecting FDA approval).
113. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at 36–37 (observing that state litigation may
expose the dangers associated with new drugs and prompt revisions of labels but this is not
required as a by-product of state action).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Brief for Former FDA Commissioners Dr. Donald Kenney and Dr. David A. Kessler
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10, Wyeth v. Levine (No. 06-1429) (Aug. 14,
2008).
117. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (assuming Congress does not
“cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of action”).
118. See Drug Amendments of 1962 (Harris-Kefauver Act), Pub. L. No. 87-781, §202, 76
Stat. 780, 793 (“Nothing in the amendments . . . shall be construed as invalidating any provision
of State law . . . .”).
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explicitly provided a preemption clause limiting state causes of
action.119
The weakness in the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision lies in the
expansive interpretation of the scope of 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6). If
the requirement that a drug manufacturer make a change prior to
receiving FDA approval is dependent on the revelation of “new”
information, then there is a valid argument for preemption as no new
120
information became available here. When the FDA approved
Phenergan’s label in 1998, it knew of the risks associated with the IV121
push method of administration. It even rejected a label that Wyeth
122
claims contained a stronger warning in reference to the IV-push
method of administration.123 Thus, changing the label would be an
explicit contradiction of FDA instructions mandating that the label be
identical to the draft submitted.124
In addition Wyeth argues that the regulatory process to approve
new drugs is nearly identical to the process to approve medical
devices, and because the Supreme Court recently upheld preemption
125
for state-law claims directed at FDA approved medical devices,
preemption should also apply to state law claims directed at FDA
126
approved drug labels.
The Vermont Supreme Court’s holding may also undermine the
FDA’s authority. The FDCA grants the FDA final authority on the
content and format of drug labeling.127 The review process for a drug
label is quite rigorous and time intensive.128 The FDA is required to
make difficult balancing decisions weighing the benefits of a drug
129
against its potential adverse affects. When the FDA’s experts
determine that the benefits of a drug outweigh the risks, the FDA

119. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (2008) (“Congress could have applied the
pre-emption clause to the entire FDCA. It did not do so, but instead wrote a pre-emption clause
that applies only to medical devices.”).
120. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S.
Dec. 21, 2007).
121. Wyeth v. Levine, 944 A.2d 179, 183 (Vt. 2006).
122. The trial court interpreted the proposed changes to be non-substantive and immaterial.
Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 189.
123. Supra note 34; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 120, at 25.
124. Id.
125. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008).
126. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 28, at 31.
127. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West 2006).
128. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996).
129. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 120, at 8.
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approves the drug.130 Allowing state failure-to-warn claims despite
FDA approval actually conflicts with the FDA’s determination that
the drug, as labeled, was safe and effective.131
For Phenergan, the FDA found that the benefits of allowing
intravenous administration of Phenergan outweighed the risks.132 The
experts for Wyeth testified that “extreme nausea can cause a patient
to lose fluid quickly, which leads to dehydration, a serious medical
condition” and that “[a] doctor, confronted with a patient in dire need
of relief from nausea, could reasonably decide that benefits of IV133
push administration would warrant taking its increased risk.” The
IV-push administration of Phenergan allows the drug to take effect
within five minutes.134 The IV-drip administration requires several
more minutes in order to take effect and the intramuscular injection
can take even longer.135
Allowing state juries to take the balancing role away from the
FDA interferes with the purpose of the FDA as a federal regulatory
136
agency. When juries are confronted with horrific facts relating to
one individual’s experience with a drug, they often fail to consider the
beneficial aspects of the drug and the thousands of patients who have
benefited from its use.137 Jury members are not likely to find that a
warning label provided sufficient information concerning risks when
138
the victim of a horrible accident is sitting before them.
When threatened with extraordinary damages from jury verdicts,
drug manufacturers are more likely to limit methods of
administration or discontinue drugs with potentially harmful sideeffects, despite knowing that the method of administration or the drug
139
itself will benefit the majority of users. Limiting administration
options and pulling drugs poses a great harm to the public by
140
decreasing availability of advantageous treatments. Congressional
130. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 3.
131. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 120, at *8.
132. Id. at 40.
133. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at 8.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 28, at 46.
137. Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008).
138. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 28, at 46.
139. Id.
140. See id. (arguing that the FDA’s responsibility extends past protecting public safety to
promoting public health, and part of promoting public health involves making decisions to keep
beneficial, yet risky, drugs available).
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intent as outlined in the FDCA was not only to have a regulatory
agency that increased the safety and effectiveness of the drugs sold in
the United States, but also to have that agency ensure consumer
141
accessibility to those drugs. Allowing state court verdicts to limit the
ability of drug manufactures to keep drugs on the market limits the
FDA’s ability to ensure consumer accessibility to beneficial treatment
options.
VI. ORAL ARGUMENT
This ruling is not likely to be the sweeping victory in favor of
preemption for which most big pharmaceutical manufacturers are
hoping.142 Levine’s arguments traced the historical regulation of
pharmaceuticals by the FDA and demonstrated that Congress has
consistently recognized state tort action.143 The absence of an express
congressional intent to preempt state claims supports Levine’s
argument that the federal regulations simply provide a minimum level
of protection that states can supplement.144 In addition, the purpose of
145
the FDA’s regulatory authority is to protect public safety. As this is,
in part, the purpose of state tort law as well, the two are not in
conflict.146
Levine pointed out that there is no statutory evidence to support
Wyeth’s argument that labeling changes under 21 C.F.R §
314.70(c)(6)(2006) must be “new.”147 Rather, drug manufacturers must
alter labels when they are aware of a significant risk, new or old, that
148
is not adequately specified in the label. In this case, Wyeth was not
certain that the FDA had performed a risk-benefit analysis pertaining
specifically to the IV-push method of administration, which detracted

141. See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 393(b) (West 2008) (stating the purpose of the FDA is to
promote safety, effectiveness, and accessibility of drugs sold in the US market).
142. See Tony Mauro, High Court Appears Torn Over Drug Labeling Case, LEGAL TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/articles.jsp?id=1202425751725 (quoting legal
expert’s belief that a ruling in favor of federal preemption can be expected in this case because
there was no evidence that Wyeth withheld information from the FDA).
143. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 9, at 30–31 (“Nothing in the FDCA’s history
suggests that Congress either viewed state-law claims intended to promote public safety and
compensate injured patients as conflicting with the federal scheme or intended to allow FDA
[approval] to immunize drug manufacturers from such claims.”).
144. Id. at 32.
145. Id. at 46.
146. Id. at 50.
147. Id. at 32.
148. Id.
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from the argument that the FDA’s preference for the use of a specific
label indicated that the IV-push method could not be proscribed or
more strongly cautioned against.149 Despite this reasoning, discussion
at the Oral Argument indicated that the Supreme Court is not likely
to read § 314.70(c)(6) quite as expansively as the Vermont Supreme
Court.150
Wyeth has the momentum of the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Reigel v. Medtronic, Inc.,151 supporting the push for preemption.
Although Reigel involved regulations that included an express
preemption clause, the eight to one decision stressed the importance
of the FDA’s authority to balance benefits and risks of proposed
medical devices.152 In addition, though it is unclear whether the FDA
specifically considered the risks and benefits of the IV-push
procedure (as opposed to intravenous administration in general),
there is a valid argument that the risk could have been considered and
resolved in favor or preserving the IV-push method of administration
for the benefit of more immediate nausea relief.153
If the United States Supreme Court overturns the Vermont
Supreme Court’s decision, the holding is likely to be extremely
narrow and focus on two primary facts: first, the fact that the FDA
had all of the relevant information and, second, the fact that Wyeth
provided four specific references to the dangers of intravenous
administration on the Phenergan label. Even though these specific
references failed to clearly distinguish between the IV-push and the
IV-drip methods of intravenous administration, and even though it
seems the FDA failed to properly analyze the risks and benefits of
each method of administration individually, there was no indication
that Wyeth misrepresented facts to the FDA.
Questions from the Supreme Court Justices at the Oral Argument
tended to focus specifically on what information was submitted to,

149. See Brief of Former FDA Commissioners Kennedy and Kessler, supra note 116, at 1415 (finding Wyeth’s argument fails because few, if any, cases show that the FDA resists when
companies try to strengthen warning labels).
150. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–41, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Nov. 3,
2008) (noting the Justices’ tendency to construe the requirement in 21 C.F.R § 314(c)(6) as
being triggered by the revelation of “new” information).
151. Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
152. Id. at 1008.
153. See Mauro, supra note 142 (noting how Scalia and several other Justices seemed
persuaded that Wyeth acted properly and according to FDA procedure in notifying the FDA of
the risk and should not be punished for the FDA’s error in judgment).
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and reviewed by, the FDA.154 Evidently, the Court was trying to
determine whether the FDA balanced the risks and benefits of the
IV-push procedure independent from the IV-drip method of
155
intravenous administration. Some Justices, most prominently Justice
Ginsberg, refused to accept that the FDA could properly perform the
balancing procedure and decide that the benefits of the IV-push
156
procedure outweighed the risk.
Because there was no evidence that Wyeth attempted to withhold
information and because Wyeth followed the FDA’s reporting
requirements, the Court will likely rule in favor of Wyeth based on a
narrowly construed implied preemption theory. The Court will likely
find that an actual conflict between state and federal law was present
under the circumstances because the state law provided an obstacle to
the accomplishment of Congressional objectives. Congress intended
for the FDA to have the authority to make careful balancing decisions
regarding the safety, effectiveness, and accessibility of drugs in the US
157
market. So long as the FDA was equipped with the appropriate
information to make such a decision, its authority should not be
usurped by state court decisions. As Justice Scalia indicated in the
Oral Argument, it appears in this instance that Wyeth complied with
the applicable statutory requirements, thus either the FDA or the
physician who improperly administered the Phenergan should be
responsible for the injury.158
In spite of the potentially favorable holding, the recent election of
a democratic President along with a majority of democrats in
Congress could soon set efforts in motion to combat any pro159
preemption decisions granted by the Court. Several key democratic
figures, including Senator Henry Waxman, the Chairman of the House
of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, have expressed grave concern over the FDA’s new policy on
154. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1–17, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Nov. 3,
2008).
155. See id. at 5 (“[T]he FDA was aware of the IV use and a certain risk. But did it ever
discreetly consider the IV-push verses the IV administered the usual way by a drip bag?”).
156. Id. at 7 (“[T]he risk of gangrene and amputation is there. No matter what benefit there
was, how could the benefit outweigh that substantial risk.”).
157. See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 393(b) (West 2008) (stating the purpose of the FDA is to
promote safety, effectiveness, and accessibility of drugs sold in the U.S. market).
158. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–29, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. Nov. 3,
2008).
159. Tony Mauro, War Over Wyeth, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 29, 2008, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/dc/PubArticleDC.jsp?id=1202426836486.
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preemption.160 An October 2008 report prepared for Senator Waxman
quoted veteran FDA officials stating the agency’s new regulations on
preemption were based on “gross misstatements” that were “naïve to
161
what actually occurs in practice.” With a democratic majority in
Washington, it is likely that the movement to combat the FDA’s new
policy on preemption, along with any protections granted to
pharmaceutical companies by the Supreme Court in this decision, will
only gain momentum.

160. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV. REFORM at 3, 110TH CONG., MAJ.
STAFF REPORT ON FDA CAREER STAFF OBJECTED TO AGENCY PREEMPTION POLICIES
(Comm. Print Oct. 2008).
161. Id.

